Gender Discrimination in Property Rights by Casari, Marco & Lisciandra, Maurizio
 ISSN 2282-6483 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Gender Discrimination in 
Property Rights 
 
 
Marco Casari 
 Maurizio Lisciandra 
 
 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N°914 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
Gender Discrimination in Property Rights 
 
Marco Casari  
University of Bologna 
and  
Maurizio Lisciandra 
University of Messina 

 
 
26 November 2013 
Abstract 
In the Middle Ages women in the Italian Alps had substantially more rights on collective properties 
than in the Modern Age. The documental evidence shows a progressive erosion of women’s rights and 
a convergence toward gender-biased inheritance systems. We tracked the evolution of inheritance 
regulations on collective land in the peasant communities of Trentino over a period of six centuries 
(13th-19th). Considering a panel of hundreds of communities, we provide a long-term perspective of 
institutional change. When population pressure increased, a patrilineal system emerged as a protective 
measure to preserve the per-capita endowment of collective properties within a community. This study 
raises general issues about the role of local level versus centralized decision-making in delivering 
gender equality and about the long-term trade-off between the protection of common resources and a 
healthy genetic pool at the community level. 
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1. Introduction 
In many societies women are discriminated against in economic and in social life. Besides cultural 
reasons, discriminatory practices and beliefs may also be rooted in economic grounds, where gender 
roles developed as a consequence of specific production technologies (e.g., Engels, 1884). We 
contribute to the economic explanations of gender discrimination by focusing on the discrimination in 
property rights. In particular, we study the structure of property rights on the common pastures and 
forests of hundreds of small peasant communities in the Italian Alps from the late medieval to the early 
contemporary period (i.e., 13
th
-19
th
 century). What emerged from a systematic analysis of the original 
documents is a clear trend of erosion in women’s rights. While in the XIII century women enjoyed 
extended or little compressed rights on the land of the community, with the advent of the modern 
period at the end of the XV century their rights became gradually weaker. By the end of the XVIII 
century the process in these alpine communities was already complete: inheritance of the collective 
properties was nearly everywhere patrilineal. 
We argue that the patrilineal system was preferred to the egalitarian one because it better protected the 
community resources from outside immigration. This pattern of institutional changes raises two general 
issues. First, the autonomous decisions at the community level brought about gender-biased inheritance 
systems that were evolutionarily stable. Left alone under decentralized decision-making, communities 
engaged in a progressive closure to outsiders. Once the process was completed, the communities 
remained locked into a situation of women’s discrimination; only a centralized political regime could 
change this course of action. Second, gender-biased inheritance systems closed the communities to 
outsiders and this had a negative impact on the genetic heritage because of increased endogamy levels. 
Communities, therefore, faced a trade-off between the protection of common resources and a healthy 
genetic pool. 
The inheritance system of the commons is a cornerstone of the ecological and demographic balance of 
traditional peasant societies (Cole and Wolf, 1974). The ecological balance can be compromised when 
the commons are overexploited (McNetting, 1981). Such overexploitation is known as “the tragedy of 
the commons”, which can occur in a one-shot interaction within a given group of users (Hardin, 1968). 
To widen the perspective, one has to consider settings where the interaction is repeated over time and 
where the size of the group of users is endogenous. Interestingly, inheritance systems play an important 
role in determining group size because they shape the incentives for migrations and fertility. We focus 
on migration because it can modify group size more quickly than changes in fertility rates. Thus, 
migration flows can trigger defensive measures and consequently institutional change at the community 
level.   
Over time, Trentino communities developed formal protective measures to limit the overexploitation of 
the common land in the form of community statutes (Casari, 2007). A community that was rich in 
terms of common land was challenged by outsiders attempting to appropriate the resource. The most 
immediate form of appropriation was trespassing, which was avoided by establishing property rights on 
the community land through the demarcation of land borders, the establishment of legal rights, and the 
hiring of guards to patrol the land. Once the resource was no longer open-access, opportunistic 
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behavior over the commons could still occur in other ways. Outsiders could move in, settle down in the 
community and claim the use of common land and resources. To prevent all residents from accessing 
the commons, insiders entitled only the original members of the community with a special legal status, 
called membership right, which granted the full belonging to the community in terms of rights and 
duties. These types of regulations and entitlements were widespread in many areas of Europe (Ostrom, 
1990, De Moor, 2008 and 2009, Alfani, 2011). However, by marrying a member of the community 
outsiders could still gain access to the commons, and their descendants. This would effectively and 
permanently increase the size of the group. Hence, here is where the inheritance system intervened. 
Under an egalitarian inheritance system, in which both men and women enjoyed membership rights, 
outsiders from poor communities could enter a rich community by marrying an insider. This had 
distributional consequences on the rich community as it contributed to depleting the per-capita amount 
of community resources. On the contrary, a patrilineal inheritance system discouraged outsider men to 
marry insider women, in this way keeping under control the net migration in the community. 
This research presents three qualifying aspects. First, it considers institutional change over a very long 
time span, which enables us to capture deep forces that shape human societies. Without this long-run 
perspective, the patterns of inheritance change may have gone unnoticed.
1
 Second, this investigation is 
not a single-case study but a panel of cases consisting of hundreds of communities in the alpine region 
of Trentino. Each community could autonomously regulate inheritance. This provided a unique natural 
experiment because communities could adopt a variety of inheritance rules. One can exploit systematic 
variations across communities to infer the drives of institutional change. Third, we observe that gender 
discrimination in property rights became more severe with the approach of the modern period; this 
provides the opportunity to study economic factors behind the process of women’s rights erosion.  
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 introduces the study and the property rights 
structure in Trentino. Section 3 presents the data sources and the institutional evidence. Section 4 puts 
forward our interpretation of the evidence. The empirical evidence is presented in section 5, which  
includes a static and a dynamic econometric model illustrating the institutional change. Section 6 
discusses some related issues; finally, section 7 puts forth our conclusions. 
 
2. Property rights in Trentino from 1200 to 1800  
2.1 The historical setting 
Trentino is a mountainous region in Northern Italy with a few hundred very small villages scattered 
over an area of about 6,200 square kilometers. According to the 1810 census, the median village 
population was 394. Figure 1 shows the shares in terms of surfaces of the land ownership according to 
land type in a selected sample of villages. Collective land was largely predominant in the forests and 
grazing lands. On the contrary, plow land and vineyards were mainly individual property, although 
some arable land could also be under a commons regime. Finally, about 25% of meadows were 
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 Similarly, Botticini and Siow (2003) provide a long-run perspective based on systematic data collection on dowry 
practices in Medieval and Early Renaissance Tuscany.  
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collective. Forests were a precious source of firewood, timber, craft furniture, and underbrush material 
used as bedding for animals. Meadows and pastures were necessary for cattle grazing and consequently 
for the production of dairy products. The commons were not open access resources, to wit, available 
for everyone to use. Instead, they were collective property of a well-defined group of individuals living 
in the same village or group of villages with legal entitlement to use the resources. Consider that less 
than 10% of the entire region was cultivable. See also Casari (2007) for a general description.  
Figure 1. Land ownership by land type (surface) 
  
 
 
 
Individual 
27.5% 
Collective 
72.5% 
Collective 
11.0% 
Individual 
89.0% 
Individual 
74.5% 
Collective 
25.5% 
(A) Forests (C) Plow land and Vineyards  (B) Meadows 
Source: 1780 cadastral registers. 
Notes: data about a sub-sample comprising 32 villages (about 10% of the total). (A) It also includes grazing land and alps; (B) meadows 
of one and double sawing at low altitudes; (C) also includes orchards and vegetable gardens. The 1780 cadastral register offers the first 
systematic land survey in this region and reports detailed data on both the rent and the surface of the various types of land (e.g., meadows, 
forests, etc.). In addition, it contains data on land ownership (e.g., individual versus collective), by village and land type. 
 
The Prince-Bishops of Trento ruled over the region for almost eight centuries: from 1027 until 1796. 
From the XIII century, the communities of Trentino gradually started to codify a set of rules for the 
management of their resources in formal documents, called charters (carte di regola). Charters were 
official deeds engrossed by a notary in the presence of external witnesses, and subsequently confirmed 
by the Prince, who granted self-government on the commons and other local economic affairs, and 
certified that the charter was compatible with the existing laws. Such documents regulated (i) the right 
to establish appropriation rules of the collective resources, (ii) the right to hold community assemblies 
and appoint a governor (regolano) and other community officials, (iii) the right to locally enforce the 
appropriation rules by levying cash fines, and (iv) the protection of community resources from external 
encroachment. Charters defined the geographical entities which, for clarity purposes, we call 
“communities” whereas, we shall call “villages” the geographical units of cadastral registers. A charter 
with a special status was the statute of Trento, the capital town, which provided for supplemental 
discipline on issues that were missing in other community charters. 
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Self-government could take place over different territorial levels. Overall, we considered 264 
communities that adopted a charter,
2
 which were organized in one of the following four ways: a) 31 
“supra-communities,” which grouped and regulated a few connected villages, of which at least one had, 
at the same time, a local charter; b) 97 “connected communities,” which, at the same time, had their 
own local charter and were within a supra-community; c) 131 “standalone communities,” which had 
their own charter and were unconnected to any supra-community; d) 5 “special communities,” 
commonly called vicinie, consisting of a few families within a village or families belonging to different 
villages jointly exploiting some portions of forests and pastures. Charters of special communities could 
be in force side by side in the same village(s) with charters of community types a), b), and c).  
The community of Civezzano was the first to write a charter in 1202. The charter system collapsed 
because of an exogenous political shock at the very beginning of 19
th
 century. Napoleon suspended the 
system after invading the region in 1796, then definitively abolished it in 1807.
3
 The most ancient 
charters did not provide a systematic discipline of all aspects of community life and management of the 
common resources. Occasionally, community rules were updated by means of new chapters within an 
existing charter, or by enacting an entirely new charter. The charters appear as pragmatic instruments 
adopted by uneducated peasants revolving around actual litigation cases. They reflected specific 
responses to external challenges or contingent problems, which can be noticed in the sequence of 
isolated tweaks to the rules produced in some communities, often listed as additions to a pre-existing 
charter. Thus, we argue that charters summarized in writing the way a community resolved critical 
controversies arisen in the past. If an issue was not present in a charter, most likely it had not been a 
controversial matter in the community. We will rely on this general interpretation rule also when 
discussing inheritance systems. 
2.2 Rights to access collective resources 
Access to the collective resources and participation in the community life could take place at different 
levels and this section provides a taxonomy. The focus in this paper will be on the membership right 
(vicinia), which defined the most complete belonging to a community. We refer to those with 
membership rights as “community members” (vicini) or “insiders.” The family was the unit of 
reference for membership rights. If husband and wife were both community members, they were 
entitled to the same benefits and duties as if only one spouse was a member. If at least one living 
individual of the family was a community member, then the benefits from the commons were extended 
to all relatives living under the same hearthstone (fuoco). The head of the family, who was usually – 
although not necessarily – the rights-holder, was the person with the rights to participate in and vote at 
community meetings. People without membership rights were “outsiders,” a category that includes also 
those with the simple right to reside in the community, or with some right to appropriate the commons. 
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 For 229 communities, at least one charter was available. There were further 10 communities with other relevant 
documents for the investigation but no information about a charter. There also existed statutes, different from charters, that 
encompassed many villages and regulated especially criminal justice (e.g., Val di Sole e Non and Valle delle Giudicarie). 
3
 In 1802 the Paris Treaty abolished the bishop principality of Trento. The Austrian government in 1805 forbad the 
gatherings of the community members in the assemblies, and in 1807 the Bavarian government, which in the meanwhile 
took power in Trentino through the peace of Presbourg (1805), abolished the Carte di Regola and subjected Trentino towns 
and villages to the central government. 
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To a certain extent, all definitions in this section are conventional, and we introduce them to better 
interpret the content of the charters.
4
 See also Casari and Lisciandra (2011) for additional details. 
The membership right gave full access to all benefits and duties. An insider enjoyed four categories of 
rights: (i) residence rights – the right to live in the community and thus have a stable domicile; (ii) full 
appropriation rights – the right to access and exploit the common resources of the community; (iii) 
participation and voting rights in community assemblies, in particular, rights to participate and speak at 
community assemblies, to appoint community officers, and to vote on decisions concerning 
management and alienation of collective resources, inheritance systems, acquisition of residence, 
appropriation, and membership rights; finally, (iv) inheritance rights, and more specifically the right to 
transmit the membership to offspring according to regulations.
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Sometimes, outsiders could live in the community with limited or no rights to access the commons. The 
most common entitlements were the appropriation right and the residence right. The appropriation 
right entailed residing in the community and granted some or all of the following entitlements: grazing, 
mowing grass, cutting timber, collecting firewood and litter, hunting and fishing, and transforming 
forests or pastures into arable land. Individuals could not pass appropriation rights on to descendants 
through inheritance. Conversely, the simple residence right did not per se entitle the right-holder to use 
the collective resources. In order to acquire the residence right, outsiders often had to formally 
introduce themselves to the community and give assurance about their integrity and economic welfare. 
Typically, residence rights were granted to artisans, shopkeepers, and servants. Fines and restrictions 
for trespassing collective lands or using collective resources without authorization applied also to those 
with residence rights. Finally, rule violations could cause the loss of that right.  
2.3 How to acquire the membership right 
There were three ways to acquire the membership right: by purchase, by inheritance from partners, and 
by inheritance from parents. 
Purchase. The membership right could be purchased from the community. It could not be purchased 
from an individual insider because a single member of the community could not transfer or alienate his 
or her individual membership right. The community assembly had to grant its formal consent in order 
to accept new members with a vote requiring a quorum ranging from a simple majority of half of the 
participants up to unanimity. Generally, outsiders had also to fulfill a few requirements such as i) 
having a good reputation, ii) paying the community treasury a certain amount of money, and iii) having 
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 The aim of this study is neither to provide a legal classification of rights nor to map in detail all cases. On the contrary, we 
aim at analyzing the documents through a parsimonious taxonomy, which reflects economic property rights, that is those 
rights that an individual can actually exploit no matter what the formal or legal definitions are. 
5
 Membership in the medieval Trentino communities presents similarities to citizenship in contemporary national states, yet 
there are at least three noteworthy differences. First, it was more pervasive in terms of rights as well as duties. Fundamental 
duty was a continuous residence within the community. Moreover, members had to collaborate to build and maintain roads, 
huts, kilns, and wood coal sites. Refusal to fulfill such duties could bring about the loss of membership. Second, the rights-
holder was the head of the family, the unique legal representative of the family in front of the community, although rights 
and duties extended to the whole family. The family was a single entity, and all families shared equal rights of access to the 
commons regardless of their size. Third, membership acquisition followed a different discipline with respect to modern 
citizenship. 
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held stable residence in the community for a certain period of time. The membership right gave equal 
rights and duties to newcomers as to pre-existing members. In Trentino, we detected 54 out of 274 
communities that allowed membership purchase. This provision was mainly mentioned in the 
community charters but it was also documented in contracts of membership purchase. 
Inheritance from partner. In case of marriage between an insider and an outsider, the insider spouse 
kept his or her status through marriage and could sometimes pass it on to their children, as we will see 
below. As a consequence of the marriage, the outsider spouse could receive – depending on the 
community – the membership right, the appropriation right, or no right at all. Whereas, in case of 
marriage between two insiders, membership rights could not be cumulated since the unit of reference 
was the family. One spouse’s membership right, typically the wife’s, remained dormant while she was 
married and became active only with widowhood.  
Inheritance from parents. The membership right became manifest when the heir left the parents to form 
a new family, or alternatively, at the rights-holder’s death. We have identified four basic inheritance 
systems for collective resources from parents: egalitarian, soft-patrilineal, patrilineal, and 
primogeniture. These inheritance systems encompass all the systems encountered in the Trentino 
charters. Egalitarian: all sons and all daughters of insiders inherited the membership rights. Soft-
Patrilineal: all sons of insiders inherited membership rights whereas daughters did not, unless 
daughters had no brothers. In the latter case, one daughter or all daughters could inherit membership. If 
only one daughter inherited the membership, she was usually designated by the father or by the 
relatives; alternatively the charters usually gave the rights to the first-born or the last-born. Patrilineal: 
all sons of insiders inherited the membership rights whereas daughters did not, even if they had no 
brothers. Primogeniture: only one child of an insider family inherited the membership rights. 
Ordinarily the heir was a son chosen by the father’s last will or, if lacking, by the closest relatives. If 
there was no son, or the son was not considered suitable and fit, one (and only one) daughter could 
inherit the membership (along with the private assets) conditionally to marrying a man, who could be 
an outsider.
6
  
3. Institutional evidence 
The evidence combines data from various sources: charters, cadastral registers, and population census. 
We identified a total of 480 community charters, of which 306 were available for reading. We also 
collected relevant information about charters modifications and other specific documents containing 
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 Depending on the specific regulation of the community, the appropriation rights could also be acquired in three ways: by 
purchase, by inheritance from a spouse, by inheritance from a parent. An individual could not sell the appropriation right 
but the community could grant it. The rationale of the transmission by inheritance of appropriation right was to compensate 
offspring or spouses who were not entitled to receive the membership right, and hence it constituted a sort of welfare system 
that allowed these persons to access the common resources when orphans or widows. Only insiders could transmit by 
inheritance the appropriation right. The orphans of insider parents could acquire the appropriation right when the 
membership right was denied. This was especially the case for daughters within a patrilineal system. Their appropriation 
right remained dormant until the death of the insider member of the family. Women who inherited appropriation rights from 
their parents could preserve or lose them after marriage. In general, appropriation rights ceased when entitled women 
married outsiders and could be preserved if they married insiders. The possible loss for widows of appropriation rights 
could be a very high price to be paid, thereby affecting marriage or remarriage decisions. 
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regulations of inheritance systems of the commons, which enabled us to build a database of 879 
observations. This evidence was organized around 366 villages as coded in the 1897 cadastral registers. 
Figure 2 shows a map of the region with the villages that adopted a charter and some regulation of the 
inheritance systems of the commons in two different years of the time interval under scrutiny, 1525 and 
1801. There was a steady increase in charter adoption during the first four centuries with a peak in the 
second half of the XVI century. In 1525, immediately before the peak, the villages that had a charter 
already covered an area equal to 64% of the region. Conversely, it is noteworthy that in 1525 hardly no 
village had formally introduced inheritance regulations over their commons within their charters or 
other relevant documents. In 1801, at the end of the time interval, the villages with a charter covered 
84% of the Trentino surface. By 1801 many communities had enacted their second or even third 
charter. Inheritance regulations became more frequent with the expansion of charters adoption, but 
notwithstanding that, villages with a formalization of inheritance rules covered only 25% of the region.  
Figure 2. Mapping charters and inheritance regulations in Trentino 
 
Notes: Areas with solid color identify the presence of a charter while areas with striped color identify the presence of inheritance 
regulations on the commons. A geographical unit in the map is colored when most of its surface satisfies the condition of having a charter 
and/or inheritance regulations by the dates of 1525 and 1801. Charters define the geographical entities that we call “communities.” We 
then mapped communities into the geographical units, the “villages”, of the 1897 cadastral registers. The current cadastral registers, 
which are the ones shown in this figure, display a coarser partition than the 1897 register.  
Three main findings about inheritance systems on the commons in Trentino emerge from the 
documental evidence in our possession. First, inheritance systems for the transmission of membership 
rights on the commons changed over time. Second, almost all changes eroded women’s rights to inherit 
collective resources. Third, the majority of the charters did not regulate inheritance of membership 
rights on collective resources.  
During the six centuries under scrutiny, the patterns of inheritance changed substantially. Table 1 
considers the area covered by villages that adopted a charter and divides the area according to the type 
of inheritance system explicitly mentioned in the documents that we were able to encode. At any one 
point in time three or four different inheritance systems in the region coexisted, since the institutional 
choice was made in a decentralized fashion at the community level. The erosion of women’s rights is 
         1525 (Peasant war)                                       1801 (Napoleon shock) 
Trento Trento 
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visible from the shift from egalitarian to soft-patrilineal systems between 1525 and 1630, and from 
another shift toward a patrilineal system before 1801. A process of gradual convergence to a unique 
system can be observed, and in particular a clear later dominance of the patrilineal system, which acted 
as an attractor. Initially, in 1348, the patrilineal system covered 24% of encoded charters with a known 
system, by 1801 it had risen to 97%. Thus, the evolution of inheritance rules is essentially 
unidirectional, going from equal membership rights for men and women toward an increasing gender 
discrimination.
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Table 1. Inheritance systems on the Trentino commons (surfaces) 
Type of system  
                                                   (surface in hectares)              
Year 
1348 1525 1630 1801 
Black death Peasant war Italian crisis Napoleon shock 
Egalitarian inheritance 43,845 43,845 0 0 
Soft-Patrilineal inheritance 6,420 6,420 54,305 2,449 
Patrilineal inheritance 16,643 21,472 68,592 151,306 
Primogeniture inheritance 2,623 2,623 2,623 2,623 
     
Area with inheritance rules (A)  69,531 74,360 125,520 156,378 
(A) in % of area with a charter in 1801 13.2% 14.1% 23.8% 29.7% 
 
Source: Elaboration on our charters database and on the 1897 cadastral register. 
Notes: The surfaces are in hectares and cover the villages with the type of inheritance system in force during a specific year considering 
the extension of the villages according to the 1897 cadastral register. In 1801 the total area of villages in Trentino that had adopted a 
charter that was also accessible amounted to 527,281 hectares.  
As illustrative cases, consider the reform of the inheritance system that took place in 1583 in the 
community of Fiemme, a valley consisting of several villages. The Governor of the community 
explains to the Prince the motivation by stating:  
“Up to now in our Fiemme Community we followed the rule that when outsiders married women who were 
members of our Community, they inherited membership rights and used the commons and the woods as much as 
any other member who was born in the Community. Since, lately, many outsiders are marrying women of the 
Fiemme community with the sole purpose of acquiring membership rights […] our Community has consensually 
convened that from now on women members of our Community shall not have nor inherit membership rights 
should they marry an outsider.”
 8
  
Hence, the inheritance system switched from egalitarian to soft-patrilineal. 
                                                          
7 A similar pattern of erosion of women’s general property rights on the commons was observed by Alfani (2011) in other 
parts of Northern Italy.  
8
 “Essendo che in la Comunità nostra de Fieme fori qua se ha osservato, che maritandose le done vicine della Comunità in 
forestieri hereditarono la vicinanza et godevano in Comuni et Boschi tanto quanto che un altro vicino nativo della valle. .. 
Et perchè da uno tempo in qua molti foresteri se maridano in done de Fieme solamente per haver detta Vicinanza […][la 
comunità] ha deliberato et determinato de Comun Consenso [...] che da qui in poi per l’avenir tutto le done vicine della 
valle maritandose in foresteri che non siano vicini della valle non debano haver ne hereditar alcuna vicinanza.” (Original 
Manuscript, AST (Archivio Storico di Trento), lat. sect. capsa XII, n.69 and n.72). This provision was also reported in the 
1613 charter of Fiemme, chapter 117 (Sartori-Montecroce, 2002). 
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The community of Fondo, for its part, switched from a soft-patrilineal to a patrilineal system in 1777 
by downgrading women’s right to access the commons from a membership right to an appropriation 
right and by removing any entitlement to inheritance: “For the future we do not want to obey the 
ancient custom with regard to community members who have no son but only one or more daughters;” 
according to the new rule, the youngest daughter of an insider could use the commons “only during her 
lifetime, and when she dies, the right to use the commons shall be extinguished; and her heirs shall be 
foreigners in the same way as if they had never been community members…”9 
After listing all documental instances of inheritance regulations, we traced the evolution of inheritance 
systems village by village over six centuries. Overall, 80 Trentino villages (out of 290 with accessible 
charters) mentioned inheritance rules in their charter or other related documents. A chart flow of 
institutional changes between 1202 and 1801 is in Figure 3, which provides a bird’s-eye view of all 
recorded changes. Figure 3 depicts a story of relentless weakening of women’s inheritance rights on the 
commons. According to our data, in the late medieval period women enjoyed the highest levels of 
equality in property rights on the common property resources. From that period on, there was a steady 
process of convergence towards a patrilineal system, without backtracking. At the end of the period, 75 
villages had a patrilineal system, 3 a soft-patrilineal system, 2 a primogeniture system and none had an 
egalitarian system. By the time Napoleon invaded Trentino and forcefully removed the charter regime, 
the process of erosion of women’s rights on the commons was already complete.  
We identified only one exception to the general tendency to restrict the inheritance of membership 
rights for women, and that is in one of the villages of the supra-community of Comun Comunale. In 
1544 Comun Comunale adopted a patrilineal system and kept it that way until the end of the charter 
regime. In 1786 the small village of Piazzo adopted its own integrative charter, in addition to the 
“supra-charter” of Comun Comunale, thereby introducing a soft-patrilineal system. Most likely, Piazzo 
did not intend to apply this system on the commons of Comun Comunale, but only to Piazzo’s 
commons. 
A separate mention is in order for the primogeniture system, which remained an isolated cluster in the 
flow chart in Figure 3. This system was prevalent in the nearby German speaking villages of South-
Tyrol (outside the bishopric of Trentino) and in the two villages of Stramentizzo and Trodena, which 
were on the linguistic border between the German and Romance speaking territories. These two 
villages did not modify their inheritance system, and, interestingly, no other Trentino village ever 
adopted a primogeniture system (Cole and Wolf, 1974). 
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 Fondo 1777: “...non vogliamo più per l’avenire osservare l’anticha osservanza con quelli vicini che non hanno eredi 
maschi ma sollo hano più ò una figliola, … per quelle che venirà al mondo, e che sarano della vicinanza più non si ha da 
usare come per il passato ma la figlia più giovine che farà tale eredita del vicinato da suo padre si concede bensì che 
questa figlia più giovine erediti il vicinato ma solo per la sua vita durante e non d’avantagio valle a dire morto che sarà 
questa sarà estinto la vicinanza, e li eredi della medema sarano forastieri come se mai fosseron stati vicini, questo servire 
debba per quelle figlie che venirano al mondo doppo il presente tempo...” (Inama, 1931, p. 24). 
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Figure 3. Changes in inheritance regulations over six centuries (villages) 
 
 
 
      11                                               11 
 
              10                                                          2 
 
                                   1                      19 
              57    
                                                                           12 
 
                  2 
No previous 
information on 
inheritance 
rules 
Egalitarian 
system (0) 
Soft Patrilineal 
system (3) 
Patrilineal 
system (75) 
Primogeniture  
system (2) 
 
Source: Elaborations on authors’ database of charters and other documents. 
Notes: Period 1202-1801. One observation consists of one village according to the geographical unit employed in the 1897 cadastral 
register. Any modification to the type of inheritance system appears in the arrows connecting the four “system” boxes on the right. Curly 
arrows record restatement and clarifications of membership rights that took place within the same type of inheritance system. One village 
restricted the soft patrilineal system from all daughters to one daughter only (Cavedine 1764). Some villages belonging to supra-
communities restated the rules either of the patrilineal system (Cimone 1768, Isera 1656, Marano 1796, Villa Lagarina 1759) or the soft-
patrilineal system (Castello di Fiemme 1605) in their village charter. Other communities restated their previous regulations (Nago-
Torbole 1628, Costa Savina 1739 and 1792, Vigalzano 1739 and 1792, Vervò 1757). Two villages with a patrilineal system specified the 
rules in more detail (Pieve Tesino 1628, Aldeno 1662). Curly arrows also include modifications to appropriation rights (Mezzolombardo 
1777, Aldeno 1753). 
The third main finding is that more than 70% of the villages did not explicitly formalize their 
inheritance system on the commons. As shown in Table 1, the area without inheritance regulations 
decreased substantially between 1348 and 1801, but still most charters did not ever mention inheritance 
rules. What was the system in place in those villages? The evidence about inheritance systems on the 
commons in the XIII century is scant. However, based on four leads, here we argue that in the late 
medieval Trentino the egalitarian system on the commons was likely to be widely followed although 
not formalized. The first lead comes from the 1425 Statute of Trento. Recall that this Statute applied to 
the whole Bishopric for those aspects that were not regulated in the local charters. The 1425 Statute 
disciplined the inheritance of private assets but not that of collective properties. It stated that, in the 
absence of a dowry for the daughters, both sons and daughters inherited the private assets of the 
parents, although the daughters inherited a lower share. On the subject, the older Statute of 1307 
devoted little attention. Secondly, the institutional history of Fiemme, a supra-community that has 
11 
 
existed as an entity since 1111,
10
 reports an explicit description of the egalitarian inheritance system 
applied to its commons, which was in place until 1583. In that year, as mentioned above, inheritance 
regulations became soft-patrilineal. Thirdly, the inheritance systems for private and collective 
properties in the same Fiemme community were identical before 1583.
11
 Fourthly, the oldest 
documental description of the egalitarian system is not a charter but a 1583 letter of the community 
governor to the Prince-Bishop. This suggests that many other communities may have followed it as a 
custom and this was why it was not explicitly written in the charters. Only thirty years later, the 1613 
community charter of Fiemme included the transcript of a portion of the letter of the Governor reported 
above. 
To put this documental evidence into a broader context, it should be recalled that charters did not 
usually regulate all aspects of community life in a systematic way but only encoded problematic 
aspects, especially those that in the past had generated controversies within the community. The 
Fiemme Governor’s letter is a vivid illustration of a practice of that kind: when the frequency of 
marriages between local women and foreign men was low, or did not cause conflicts within the 
community, there was little pressure to encode the inheritance rule into the charters. Another 
illustration of how charters encoded regulations comes from the explicit norms about the purchase of 
membership rights by outsiders. One can expect that those communities with immigration pressure 
were more likely to regulate both membership purchase and membership inheritance. In fact, among 
the villages that mention membership purchase (79 out of 289), about 68% also had inheritance 
regulations at some point. Whereas, among the villages with no mention of membership purchase 
(210), only 12% had inheritance regulations. One way to read this regularity is that field controversies 
were what generated formal regulations. 
To draw a conclusion, one can put together the non-systematic codification of inheritance systems on 
the commons, especially in the early period, as well as the pragmatic spirit of the community charters. 
If all marriages were between insiders it was practically irrelevant for a community to be under an 
egalitarian or a patrilineal inheritance system. A marriage between an insider and an outsider had 
different consequences under the two inheritance systems only if the outsider was the husband and the 
new family wanted to live in the community of the wife. When no such cases occurred, because there 
was no immigration pressure toward the community, then the two systems were observationally 
equivalent. The charter would be changed only when the attempts to immigrate through marriage were 
frequent or controversial. 
4. Inheritance systems and community size  
We argue that gender discrimination in inheritance regulations emerged as an attempt to limit the size 
of the community and to protect insiders’ wealth. Inheritance regulations in a community could impact 
its population level through at least two channels, one that altered migration patterns across 
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 The Gebardini Pacts, signed on July 14
th
, 1111 between the Bishop of Trento Gebardo and the representatives of the 
Community of Fiemme, gave judicial and tax autonomy to the Community (see Sartori-Montecroce 2002). 
11 From the 1613 charter, chapter 114 (Le consuetudini di Fiemme - Libro II del civil), in Sartori-Montecroce (ibid.) p. 278. 
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communities and another that modified incentives for endogenous growth. In the dynamics of 
community size, migration was a short-run factor while endogenous growth was a long-run factor. 
Migrations alone could increase or decrease the size of single communities also in a scenario of stable 
population at regional level. Assuming that everyone marries, if the spouses are from different 
communities they can decide to settle down in the community of the husband or in the community of 
the wife. Assuming further that the family has two children. If private assets are mobile, the family will 
want to settle in the community that is “richer” in terms of collective resources. Because of this 
incentive, the young generation of a rich community could attract spouses from poorer communities 
who want to move in to benefit from access to richer commons. Under an egalitarian inheritance 
system, if every member of the young generation marries an outsider, the number of families in a 
community may double. Hence, the per-capita collective wealth in a rich community may halve within 
the time period of a generation, whereas the poorer communities observe an increase. One has also to 
consider that cross-community marriages may present some benefits from a collective point of view: 
small communities – as the ones in Trentino – run into severe risks of consanguinity if all marriages are 
between insiders, cross-community marriages reduce this risk. Conversely, a patrilineal inheritance 
system can effectively prevent net immigration via marriage. This system does not forbid marriages 
with outsiders, but it ensures that the number of families in the next generation will remain the same. In 
particular, wives will move to their husbands’ communities since the new family has no access to the 
commons of the wife’s original community. Hence, under a patrilineal inheritance system on the 
commons, the community will maintain its size and some genetic mixing will still be possible: for 
every man marrying an outside woman, one woman of that man’s community will have to move out. 
The same outcome can be achieved through a primogeniture system.
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To sum up, if all communities in the region have an egalitarian inheritance system, then the inequality 
in per-capita collective wealth will decline and reach minimal levels. In contrast to that, if all 
communities have a patrilineal inheritance system, the inequality in per-capita collective wealth will 
persist. In case both systems co-exist in the region, what matters is the type of system adopted by the 
communities better endowed in terms of per-capita collective wealth. In order to avoid reductions in 
their share of collective resources, insiders of rich communities tend to adopt gender-biased inheritance 
systems. Contrariwise, the choice about inheritance rules of insiders of poor communities is irrelevant: 
migratory patterns would be unaffected by their type of inheritance system, whether it is formalized or 
not. This can explain why we observed many communities without written inheritance regulations 
(Table 1). A formal model of migratory pressure along these lines is presented in Casari and Lisciandra 
(2013).  
The choice of inheritance system on the commons can make a difference also in terms of fertility rates, 
and, consequently, on endogenous population growth. This phenomenon has been known at least since 
Hardin (1968) and it relates to the tragedy of the commons with regard to population control. Parents’ 
decision about the number of kids is private but – when the kids have also access to collective 
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 It is easy to show that the outcome under a soft-patrilineal inheritance system is in-between those of an egalitarian and a 
patrilineal system. 
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resources – it becomes a matter of public concern. When the survival of a family lies exclusively on its 
own private resources, the family bears the full costs of having an additional child. Instead, if the 
family relies also on the collective land, the incentives to have children are higher because of the 
externality of appropriating collective resources. A portion of the cost of the additional child falls on 
the community at large, whose resources are subject to the typical mechanism of the tragedy of the 
commons. In an egalitarian inheritance system “everyone born has an equal right to the commons” and 
this would “lock the world into a tragic course of action” (Hardin, 1968). The solution to the tragedy 
about population control is a change in the inheritance system. The adoption of a primogeniture system 
on the commons fully removes the “tragedy” because additional children after the first one do not 
impose negative externalities on the community commons. A patrilineal system provides a partial 
solution because it lessens individual incentives to have additional children with respect to the 
egalitarian system as, in the long-run, only about half of the children, the boys, can count on the 
community commons. The patrilineal system attenuates, but does not solve, the tragedy about 
population control because for every additional child there is still some probability that the cost will be 
shifted to the community at large.  
As previously argued, inheritance regulations had an impact on the dynamics of community size. In 
comparison with a patrilineal system, an egalitarian system increased incentives for both fertility and 
immigration. On the one hand, in Trentino the incentive for fertility was exacerbated by the presence of 
low-populated communities with large shares of commons. On the other hand, the existence of large 
inequalities among villages in per-capita collective wealth and the increment of population in the 
region triggered internal migrations. Although both fertility and migration push communities toward a 
change in the inheritance rules in order to protect their collective resource from depletion, we claim 
that the main drive for the institutional change in inheritance rules was the attempt to reduce migratory 
pressure occurring through marriage, because migration operates more quickly and is more “visible” 
than endogenous population growth. Hence, the remaining of the section discusses migrations. 
Migration mainly occurs because individuals from poor communities may want to move into a rich 
community. Therefore, a high inequality in per-capita collective wealth across communities gives rise 
to this course. Unfortunately, we lack systematic data about migratory flows, size, and wealth at the 
community level over the six centuries, but we have been able to construct an inequality index for 
thirty-two villages using 1780 cadastral data and 1810 population census data.
13
 The resulting Gini 
index in per-capita collective wealth shows a high level of inequality (0.61). The corresponding index 
in per-capita total wealth denotes a lower level of inequality (0.27). The difference in the two indices 
denotes how commons were more unequally distributed than individual properties. This suggests that 
communities with a higher commons endowment may have acted to prevent the leveling-off in 
commons wealth among the communities in the region.  
The reason for the persisting inequality across villages in the value of per-capita collective wealth, we 
believe, was the occurrence of a series of shocks on population and wealth in the form of fires, 
landslides, flooding, famines, and plagues. These factors caused divergence because the shocks were 
                                                          
13 This sample from the 1780 register corresponds to 37 villages in the 1897 cadastral register (10% of all villages). 
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likely to hit villages in an asymmetric fashion. Since shocks could occur, perfect equality was unlikely 
even in a society that universally adopted an egalitarian system. The frequency and magnitude of the 
asymmetric shocks were likely to dominate the speed of population adjustments, the latter being less 
intense with patrilineal inheritance systems.
14
 
Figure 4. Population estimates in the Centre-North of Italy and Trentino 
 
Source: Malanima (2002) for the Centre-North of Italy. Cole and Wolf (1974) for Trentino in years 1312, 1427, 1650, 1754. Further 
Trentino estimates: Debiasi (1953) in 1700; Franceschini (2009) in 1594, 1704; Chiocchetti and Chiusole (1965) in 1780. 
Notes: The Centre-North of Italy includes Piedmont, Val d’Aosta, Nice, Monaco, Lombardy, Veneto, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli, Istria, 
Liguria, Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, and Marche. Fiebiger (1959) estimates that Trentino made up 34.7% of the entire Tyrol 
population in 1754. We applied this fraction to the estimates of Tyrol population in Wopfner (1954) for antecedent dates. The Trentino 
population estimates in Franceschini (ibid.) refer to the 1573-1615 and 1685-1723 time intervals, for which we considered the median 
years 1594 and 1704, respectively. 
Migratory pressure will be even stronger when regional population increases. The available evidence 
refers to population estimates for the Centre-North of Italy and for Trentino (Figure 4). Overall, the 
population in Centre-North Italy grew from 1300 to 1800 by 32%, whereas in Trentino from 1312 to 
1754-1780 by 131%. More precisely, population estimates for Trentino come from a variety of sources 
and are of 83,373 units in 1312 and 167,000 units in 1594, 206,000 in 1754, and 180,000 in 1780.
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Although we have only scattered estimates of Trentino population, the patterns for Centre-North Italy 
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 After centuries under an egalitarian inheritance system, one may expect that both migrations and endogenous population 
growth should have brought about a situation of near equality. Direct support for this view requires evidence that we cannot 
provide on the inequality levels at the time when communities started to restrict women’s inheritance rights. However, as 
documented in the previous section, restrictions occurred over time without a clear-cut switch. Furthermore, if migrations 
and endogenous population growth had indeed generated equality in per-capita collective wealth by, say, the end of XVI 
century, one needs to explain what produced the inequality observed two centuries later. Consider that long-run 
convergence in per-capita collective wealth should have occurred also after women’s inheritance rights started to be 
restricted, assuming that fertility were positively related to per-capita wealth. 
15
 According to Malanima (2002) the population in the Centre-North Italy in 1620 was 8,100,000, whereas in 1800 was 
10,120,000. The 131% increase in Trentino population considers the average between the estimates of 1754 and 1780. 
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and Trentino appear similar. In particular, from the more systematic data of the entire Centre-North of 
Italy, one can identify some focal dates that marked a change in the direction of population growth and 
levels, such as the Black Death of 1348 and the Italian crisis of 1630. 
These population patterns can explain the institutional change that are observed in inheritance 
regulations. The frequency of inheritance regulations on the commons in community documents 
increases in periods of population growth. More specifically, Table 2 illustrates the number of first 
mentions or changes in inheritance regulations broken down by periods of regional population increase 
and decrease. This evidence appears to point to the role of demographic pressure in the institutional 
change. A more systematic analysis will be provided in the following section.   
Table 2. Population trends and inheritance regulations (documents)  
Time 
Interval 
Population trend 
Number of documents 
reporting inheritance 
regulations (A) 
Number of encoded 
charters (B) 
(A)/(B) 
1200-1347 Increase 2 14 14.3% 
1348-1430 Decrease 1 22 4.5% 
1431-1600 Increase 16 135 11.9% 
1601-1630 Increase (above 1348 level) 8 21 38.1% 
1631-1650 Decrease 3 12 25.0% 
1651-1700 Increase 6 18 33.3% 
1701-1800 Increase (above 1630 level) 24 78 30.8% 
 
Source: Elaboration on authors’ database of charters and related archival documents. Population trends are from Malanima (2002) and 
refer to Centre-North Italy. 
Notes: (A) includes all documents mentioning both first formalization and subsequent restrictions or restatements of inheritance 
regulations. The number of documents (A) and the number of encoded charters (B) here reported exclude those documents mentioning the 
inheritance systems but having an antecedent charter – in previous time intervals – existing but unavailable. These documents refer to the 
following communities: Croviana, Giovo and Faedo, Matarello, Varignano, Vervò, Vezzano and Padergnone. For example, Croviana 
mentions the inheritance system in the 1727 charter, however the previous charter was written in 1427 but it is unavailable. This is to 
avoid that we count charters mentioning the inheritance system that could have previous charters also mentioning the inheritance system 
and that actually introduced the inheritance regulation. Further, the number of encoded charters includes both first and subsequent 
charters. 
In sum, we observe two factors triggering internal migrations: inequalities in the values of per-capita 
collective wealth and regional population growth. Both factors induced communities to adjust their 
inheritance systems on the commons in order to restrict the influx of outsiders and to protect collective 
resources. In particular, wealth inequalities help to explain why some communities adopted inheritance 
regulations whereas others did not, while the regional population growth had more to do with the 
timing of institutional change. 
5. Empirical evidence 
This section presents a regression analysis about the factors influencing the introduction of inheritance 
regulations in each village. The empirical analysis includes two models of inheritance regulations 
adoption, one static and one dynamic. The static model presents factors that influenced the decision of 
a community to introduce inheritance regulations at any point in time before 1800 (inheritance). The 
dynamic model is an event history model aiming to explain – during the entire period under scrutiny – 
which factors influenced the occurrence of the first formalization of inheritance systems (event). One 
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village is the unit of observation and corresponds to a geographic entity in the 1897 cadastral register. 
Out of the 366 villages in the cadastral register, the dataset considers the 289 villages that had adopted 
a charter by the year 1800. Those villages had at least one encoded charter in our database.
16
 
Static model 
The static model explains the village adoption of an inheritance regulation at any one time before 1800 
(Tables 3 and 4). Proxies are built for the size of the village, its remoteness and wealth. The proxy for 
village size is the village population taken from the 1810 census (pop1810).
17
 Proxies for village 
remoteness are the walking distance in km (dis_tn) and the altitude difference (diffalt_tn) from Trento, 
the regional capital, which has a central position in the region (Figure 2). The two proxies are weakly 
correlated (=0.38).  
Proxies for wealth include the per-capita value of collective land (pc_common_value) and the per-
capita value of total village land (pc_total_value). These variables use the 1897 cadastral register data 
on surfaces and the 1810 census data about village population (pop1810). We based the estimates of 
land value per hectare and ownership shares on the 1780 cadastral register. The value of collective land 
in a village (common_value) results from considering three factors: the surface of the 1897 land by type 
multiplied by the 1780 estimated land values by type, and then multiplied by the 1780 estimated 
ownership share of collective land. The resulting value was divided by the 1810 village population to 
obtain the variable pc_common_value.  
The 1897 data cover all villages in the region while we have the 1780 data only for about 10% of 
villages. Our data on the 1897 register includes the surface for each type of land by village but neither 
rent nor ownership records. Because the land classifications in the 1780 and 1897 registers were 
slightly different (e.g., what is called grazing land in one dataset may be classified as meadows in the 
other), we carried out an analysis on surfaces to identify the best way to match the two sources. We 
then used the 1780 land rents to compute the relative value of each type of land. Forests, grazing land, 
and alps pooled together served as numeraire. Vineyards, for instance, were worth per hectare about 5.5 
times the numeraire.
 
Finally, we employed the 1780 ownership shares for each type of land to estimate 
collective land on the 1897 surface data.
18
 The value of total land in a village (total_value) is the sum 
of the values of collective and individual land. The estimate of land value by type could differ between 
individual and collective land. For each type of land we estimated land values separately by ownership 
according to the 1780 rents. 
                                                          
16 Trento, the capital town, was dropped from the original 290 villagesdataset; those villages were characterized by at least 
one encoded charter. 
17
 Andreatta and Pace (1981). As in Casari (2007), when break-downs at the village level is not available, we use as shares 
the proportions from 1897 data (Consiglio provinciale d’agricoltura pel Tirolo, 1903).  
18
 pc_common_value = Total value of collective land / village population. Total value of collective land = by land type (1780 
value of land type)x(1780 ownership share of land type)x(1897 surface of land type) = 7.72x0.255x(meadows) + 
0.725x(grazing land+alps+forest) + 8.93x0.137x(plow land) + 22.92x0.015x(fruit and garden) + 5.56x0.003x(vineyard). 
Total value of private land = 10.19x(1-0.255)x(meadows) + 0.91x(1-0.725)x(grazing land+alps+forest) + 10.51x(1-
0.137)x(plow land) + 24.59x(1-0.015)x(fruit and garden) + 13.12x(1-0.003)x(vineyard). 
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An additional wealth variable provides the value of collective land divided by the value of individual 
land (ratio_value). In the empirical model, this ratio can capture the presence of production 
complementarities between collective and individual land. Consider that collective land consisted 
generally of mostly forest, alps, and pastures at high altitudes while private land was mostly made up of 
cropland and meadows at low altitudes. Cattle grazing, for instance, is more productive if meadows at 
low altitude are used during wintertime and grazing land and alps at high altitude are used during 
summertime. Each village needed both types of land for efficient agricultural production. Across 
villages there is a high correlation between the surfaces of collective land and individual land (=0.97). 
A similar correlation is reported for land value (=0.78). Table 3 below summarizes the statistics of all 
the variables mentioned above. 
Table 3. Summary statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  Dependent variables     
inheritance  .277 .448 0 1 
inheritance or membership purchase .398 .490 0 1 
   
 Independent variables 
    
pop1810 633.26 719.38 52 7069 
dis_tn 48.67 28.92 2.90 129 
diffalt_tn 483.41 289.39 -121 1385 
pc_common_value 2.47 1.96 .08 19.45 
pc_total_value 7.42 3.56 .80 31.11 
ratio_value .48 .27 .092 1.67 
 
Source: Dataset constructed by the authors. 
Notes: The number of observations is 289. Trento has not been included because it is the capital town. “Inheritance or membership 
purchase” is a dependent variable coded as 1 if a village either had inheritance regulation or gave outsiders the possibility to purchase 
membership or both, and as 0 if otherwise.  
Among the regressors there are proxies for community remoteness (dis_tn and diffalt_tn) and wealth 
(pc_common_value, pc_total_value, and ratio_value). Since villages that adopted formal inheritance 
regulations could have different population dynamics to villages that did not adopt any regulation, it is 
likely that there are issues of endogeneity of the community size variable (pop1810). As a 
consequence, the variables pc_common_value and pc_total_value could suffer from the same problem. 
For this reason the model estimation employs an instrumental variable probit. Given the small set of 
variables available, we use as instruments common_value and total_value respectively for their 
corresponding per-capita variables.
19
  
The static model shows four specifications (Table 4). In all specifications a Wald test of exogeneity 
confirms the presence of endogeneity in the structural equation and, consequently, the correctness of 
                                                          
19 The instruments satisfy the correct requirements. The correlations between pc_common_value and its instrument is 0.50, 
and between pc_total_value and its instrument is 0.26. The correlations do not appear strong, especially the second. 
However, we performed weakness tests on the instruments by considering the robustness of the F-statistics in the first-stage 
of the 2sls linear probability models. The instruments appear robust: common_value at 1% and total_value at 5%. 
18 
 
the adoption of the instrumental variable technique.
20
 Specification (1) uses as regressors the two 
proxies of remoteness and the per-capita proxy for common land. The per-capita value of collective 
land significantly and positively influence the introduction of formal inheritance rules. This supports 
the interpretation that communities more endowed in per-capita collective wealth are induced to 
formalize inheritance regulations in order to protect their wealth. In addition, more remote villages in 
terms of altitude were significantly less likely to formalize inheritance rules (diffalt_tn). Our 
interpretation is that villages in the high mountains did not need to formalize inheritance systems 
because they were far from any migration routes threatening their commons. Walking distance (dis_tn) 
from Trento is weakly significant with a negative coefficient. One may expect a weak significance of 
its coefficient because high walking distance also includes easily accessible villages.    
Table 4.  Regulations about inheritance on the commons by 1800 (static model) 
Dependent variable  
(1= regulation, 0=otherwise) 
Inheritance 
regulation 
Inheritance 
regulation 
Inheritance or 
membership 
purchase 
regulation  
Inheritance or 
membership 
purchase 
regulation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
dis_tn -0.0112 -0.0091 -0.0162 -0.0116 
 (0.0067)* (0.0063) (0.0067)** (0.0063)* 
diffalt_tn -0.0020 -0.0011 -0.0020 -0.0010 
 (0.0005)*** (0.0005)** (0.0004)*** (0.0004)** 
pc_common_value 0.2564  0.2597  
 (0.1230)**  (0.1211)**  
pc_total_value  0.3324  0.3475 
  (0.0455)***  (0.0360)*** 
ratio_value  -2.5567  -2.7303 
  (0.5812)***  (0.5527)*** 
Constant -0.3107 -1.3245 0.5627 -0.8710 
 (0.3103) (0.3453)*** (0.3069)* (0.3764)** 
Wald test of exogeneity (Prob>χ2) 0.0125 0.0022 0.0044 0.0002 
log likelihood -637.8 -821.4 -666.7 -847.9 
Number of observations
 
289 289 289 289 
 
Source: Database constructed by the authors. 
Notes: Instrumental variable probits. Dependent variables: inheritance regulation, inheritance or membership purchase regulation. To 
control for fixed effects, 12 area dummies are included among regressors; they are not reported in the table. Trento, the capital town, has 
not been included. The figures in parenthesis are standard deviations. * denotes significance at a 10 percent level, ** at a 5 percent level, 
and  *** at a 1 percent level. 
In specification (2) there are two alternative wealth proxies: the per-capita value of total village land 
(pc_total_value) – which is interesting because it removes issues about incorrect estimates of 
ownership shares – and the value ratio between collective vs. individual land (ratio_value), which can 
capture complementarities in production between different types of land independently of village size. 
This latter regressor is not in specification (1) because of multi-collinearity issues. The higher the per-
capita value of total land the more likely it was that the village had inheritance regulations. Moreover, a 
lower ratio is associated with a higher frequency of inheritance regulations. Those villages with 
                                                          
20 A rejection of the null hypothesis of exogeneity means that the error terms in the structural equation and the reduced-form 
equation for the endogenous variable are correlated. Thus, instrumenting the endogenous variable was correct. 
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relatively scarce commons with respect to their individual land may have suffered more from an influx 
of outsiders because of existing complementarities between collective and individual land. Conversely, 
villages relatively more endowed with collective than individual land, did not feel threatened by 
newcomers and the increase in their population. 
As a robustness check, specifications (3) and (4) replicate the static model using an alternative 
dependent variable. Because of archival issues or destroyed documents, it is possible that we missed 
documents that regulated inheritance. For this reason we also considered the villages that regulated 
membership purchase. The introduction of a regulation on the purchase of membership rights points 
toward a pressure coming from people who wanted to move into the community. Regulation on 
membership purchase could be seen as another instrument to regulate migratory pressures. Depending 
on the village, the quorum required for accepting outsiders through membership purchase was between 
a simple majority and unanimity of insiders. This alternative variable takes value 1 if the village either 
regulated inheritance or gave outsiders the possibility to purchase membership or both, and 0 if 
otherwise. Both the inheritance and membership regulations were proxies of the village closure against 
migratory pressures. Specifications (3) and (4) confirm all results emerging from specifications (1) and 
(2).  
Dynamic model 
A dynamic model can exploit both whether and when a village formalized inheritance regulations. The 
timing of inheritance regulations varied considerably across villages (Figure 2). An event history model 
is used to obtain the estimates presented in Table 5. This estimation technique relies on an event or 
transition, which in our case is the time of adoption of written inheritance regulations on the commons 
in a given village. The dataset is a panel based on the 289 villages as in the static model with 
observations at five-year time intervals between the years 1200 and 1800. As long as there is no 
transition the dependent variable is set to zero, if the event occurs the dependent variable is set to 1 and 
the village is then deleted from the subsequent time intervals of the data set. The event history model 
estimates the probability that the event occurs in the time interval between t and t+5, conditional on the 
village not having experienced the event at or before time t (risk set). The equation employed to 
estimate the event history model is the following probit equation: 
              (1) 
wherein Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, P(t) is the hazard rate consisting of 
the ratio between the number of events occurred in time t (i.e., formalization of inheritance regulation 
on the commons) and the number of “surviving” villages in time t (risk set);21 a(t) is the time trend; X1 
is the vector of time-invariant variables; X2 is the vector of time-variant variables; u(t) is the i.i.d. error 
term such that E[u(t)]=0 and Var[u(t)]=σ2.   
                                                          
21 Put differently, P(t) is the probability that a village adopts a regulation of the inheritance system on the commons at time 
t. 
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Table 5. Regulations about inheritance on the commons (dynamic model) 
Dependent variable: 
event=1 if adopted regulation in the 
time period, =0 if not yet adopted  
Inheritance 
regulation 
Inheritance  
regulation 
 
Inheritance or 
membership 
purchase regulation 
Inheritance or 
membership  
purchase regulation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
poptime_cn 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
 (0.0001)** (0.0001)** (0.0001)** (0.0001)*** 
Poptrend 0.2818 0.2770 0.3155 0.3115 
 (0.1309)** (0.1309)** (0.1157)*** (0.1158)*** 
dis_tn -0.0025 -0.0013 -0.0041 -0.0031 
 (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0030) 
diffalt_tn -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 
 (0.0002)** (0.0002)** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** 
pc_common_value -0.0024  -0.0113  
 (0.0270)  (0.0245)  
pc_total_value  0.0205  0.0182 
  (0.0151)  (0.0129) 
ratio_value  -0.3569  -0.3903 
  (0.2430)  (0.2111)* 
f_centerin 0.8518 0.8613 0.8664 0.8814 
 (0.2395)*** (0.2406)*** (0.1820)*** (0.1828)*** 
Constant -3.0122 -3.0769 -2.7730 -2.8158 
 (0.1881)*** (0.2048)*** (0.1595)*** (0.1724)*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.086 0.089 0.066 0.069 
log likelihood -510.3 -508.9 -705.0 -703.1 
Number of observations 31,618 31,618 30,122 30,122 
 
Source: Database constructed by the authors. 
Notes: Event history model (probit function). To control for fixed effects, 12 area dummies are included among regressors; they are not 
reported in the table. All villages are in the dataset at the starting date. Trento, the capital town, has not been included. The figures in 
parenthesis are standard deviations. * denotes significance at a 10 percent level, ** at a 5 percent level, and  *** at a 1 percent level.  
In the dynamic model the time-invariant regressors are the walking distance from Trento (dis_tn), the 
difference in altitude with Trento (diffalt_tn), and the ratio between the value of collective and 
individual land (ratio_value) as in the static model. There are five time-variant regressors. A village 
size estimate at time t (poptime_cn), which is built by taking the 1810 village population and scaling it 
using the ratio between the Centre-North Italy population at time t and in the year 1800.
22
 The per-
capita value of total village land (pc_total_value) and the per-capita value of the commons 
(pc_common_value) are built by taking the corresponding static model variables and dividing them by 
poptime_cn. The direction of population change in the Centre-North of Italy (poptrend) is a binary 
variable that takes value 0 when regional population decreased and 1 when it increased over the time 
intervals presented in Table 2. Finally, the model includes a variable about contagion (f_centerin), 
which consists of the fraction of villages around the same reference center that have already adopted 
inheritance regulations at time t.
23
 Notice that the population variable and the per-capita variables are 
                                                          
22 For the population of Centre-North Italy see Malanima (2002). However, the data in Malanima do not cover the XIII 
century. The population data available for Italy in Bellettini (1987) have been used to rescale villages population in 1300 
backward to 1200.  
23 The 17 reference centers are: Borgo, Canale S. Bovo, Canazei, Cavalese, Cles, Condino, Fondo, Levico, Malè, 
Mezzolombardo, Pergine, Pinè, Riva del Garda, Rovereto, Stenico, Tione, Trento. 
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no longer endogenous as in the static model and are now included. This is the peculiarity of the history 
event model since, once the event (i.e., adoption of regulation) has occurred, the village is dropped 
from the dataset for the remaining time intervals.  
The results from the dynamic model presented in Table 5 are in line with those of the static model. In 
specifications (1) and (2) the dependent variable is the adoption of inheritance regulations in a given 5-
year time interval. Remoteness and wealth proxies have the correct sign. While remoteness in terms of 
altitude is significant, wealth proxies are non-significant. We have reasons to believe that the lack of 
significance of the wealth proxies could originate from their inaccuracies. We have neither cadastral 
data nor regular population census for each time interval along the six centuries considered. During 
such long horizon villages could have sold, purchased, individualized collective properties, or changed 
community boundaries through mergers and fissions.  
Following specifications (1) and (2), there are three interesting findings coming from the time-variant 
regressors. First, in periods of regional population growth (poptrend), villages were significantly more 
likely to adopt inheritance regulations, which is consistent with our view of regional population growth 
as a trigger for institutional change. Second, inheritance regulations spread by contagion. The more 
widespread the adoption of inheritance regulations in nearby villages had been, the significantly more 
likely was the village itself to adopt a regulation (f_centerin). An interpretation is that inheritance 
systems in nearby villages shifted the migratory pressure onto other close villages without clear 
inheritance restrictions. Those villages could then decide to formalize inheritance rules as a defensive 
measure, which they may have not done otherwise. Third, larger villages in terms of population were 
significantly more likely to adopt inheritance regulations (poptime_cn). This finding builds on Casari 
(2007), which shows that the largest villages were more likely to adopt a charter, and also to have more 
ancient charters. The existing correlation between group size and inheritance regulations is not the 
consequence of a selection bias because villages that did not adopt a charter were excluded from the 
regressions. 
Also for the dynamic model we performed the robustness check using an alternative dependent 
variable. Specifications (3) and (4) in Table 5 explain the adoption of inheritance or membership 
purchase regulations or both. These confirm all results emerging from specifications (1) and (2). In 
addition, they largely strengthen the statistical significance of the above results. Importantly, the value 
ratio of collective vs. individual land is here weakly significant and with the same sign as in the static 
model. 
6. Discussion 
This section touches upon three issues related to inheritance regulations: (i) the implications for genetic 
health, (ii) the viability of a matrilineal system as an alternative way to close the community, and (iii) 
the consequences of the exogenous removal of the charters regime by Napoleon at the beginning of the 
XIX century. These issues will be developed in the same order. 
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Figure 5. Closure of communities: two centuries of endogamy in marriage 
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Source: Motta (1978) from parish registers. 
Notes: 8 parishes nearby the Fersina Valley ordered from the smallest to the largest, plus the entire valley (Obs. 9); the number of total 
marriages in the period is noted next to each marker. Endogamy is measured as the frequency of marriages among spouses that were 
living in the same parish. The total sum of marriages across the 8 parishes is higher than the number of marriages in the Fersina Valley; 
the reason may lie in classifying part of the parishes as being outside the Fersina Valley. 
(i) The wave of adoptions of inheritance systems that restricted women’s rights generated a progressive 
social closure of the communities, which reflected also on marriage patterns and, consequently, on 
societal genetic health. In the early modern period, one can see a general trend of increasing endogamy 
in marriage within the Trentino communities. This statement is based on data from marriage registers 
of 17 parishes across a time span that varied among parishes and covers selected years between 1584 
and 1800. One measure of endogamy level is the frequency of matrimonial dispensations for 
consanguinity and another measure is the frequency of marriages between spouses living in the same 
parish. The Fassa Valley showed an increasing trend in both measures of endogamy levels during the 
entire 18
th
 century. The two measures were positively correlated when considering 10-year intervals 
(=0.41, N=10). This evidence supports the use of the frequency of marriages between spouses coming 
from the same parish as another measure of endogamy. Even more interesting is the case of the 
parishes in the Fersina Valley, for which we compared the average endogamy levels in years 1584-
1674 vs. years 1675-1774 (Figure 5). When controlling for parish size, we estimated a 7 percentage-
point increase in the average level of endogamy before and after 1675.
24
 This evidence points toward a 
                                                          
24
 For statistical reasons, in a large parish in terms of number of marriages there was a higher frequency of spouses who 
were both living in the same parish, which is our available measure of endogamy level in the Fersina valley. A tobit 
regression on the endogamy level [0,1] uses as independent variables the number of marriages in years 1584-1674 and 
1675-1774, and a dummy variable for the 1584-1674 period. Thus, the total number of observations is 18 when considering 
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progressive closure of the Trentino communities, which became more inward-looking when choosing 
marriage partners.
25
  
(ii) Unlike gender-biased inheritance systems, egalitarian systems encourage population growth, 
especially in attractive communities. In Trentino, the institutional change shifted the society toward a 
patrilineal system for property rights on the common resources. An alternative path could have been a 
shift toward a matrilineal system, where men lost their rights. According to the interpretation in section 
4, a matrilineal system would have accomplished the same results as a patrilineal system.  
Patrilineal inheritance systems on collective resources have been the most widespread systems around 
the world. There exist, however, ethno-linguistic groups with matrilineal inheritance on common 
property land. We briefly describe three cases: central and southern Malawi, Sumatra, and the Garos 
ethnic group in North-Eastern India. In the modern Malawi there are currently matrilineal societies, in 
particular the Chewa group, where the husband moves to the wife’s village, and widowers or divorced 
men are expected to return to their natal village and lose the appropriation rights to the land in their 
wife’s village. However, the family’s key decision-maker concerning farm management still remains 
the husband (Place and Otsuka 2001, Hansen et al. 2005, Takane 2008).  
In Sumatra the lineage land, particularly that for paddy fields, has traditionally been owned collectively 
by a group of akin members, and this group usually consisted of a grandmother, her husband, children, 
and grandchildren. This land is customarily bequeathed from mothers to daughters according to the 
decision of the lineage head, who is normally the maternal uncle. The share tenancy also follows that 
rule. Women are the guardians of lineage land and can oppose the transfer of land to non-family 
members. Men typically cultivate their wives’ lands or, if unmarried, they work as farm laborers or 
emigrate to other areas to accumulate savings or establish a trade. However, as in the Malawi case, it is 
primarily husbands who make farm management decisions, even though they have no customary land 
rights (Otsuka et al. 2001, Suyanto et al. 2001, Quisumbing and Otsuka 2001, Quisumbing et al. 2001).  
The old Garos’ inheritance system is the most biased towards women among traditional societies. Until 
the turn of the XIX century, they practiced matrilineal inheritance. Commons’ use rights were tied to 
residence and men were supposed to move to their wife’s village. Men could not inherit property under 
any circumstance, and self-acquired property of men belonged to the closest female ascendant or 
descendant or, if married, to their wives. This female-biased system could also be explained by the fact 
that women played a major role in crop production and the gathering of forest produce.
26
 However, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
both the 8 villages and the entire valley. The coefficient of the dummy is significant at the 5% level. When removing the 
observations of the valley (N=16), the coefficient is significant at the 10% level. 
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 The other endogamy data are from Cogolo, Borgo Valsugana, Predazzo, Levico, Pergine, Rovereto, Moena, Forno. 
26 Similarly, Fleck and Hanssen (2009) found that the inheritance system on private land in the ancient Sparta mirrored work 
specialization. Sparta based its agricultural production on occupied land by means of captive labor force, thus men could 
specialize in military activities rather than in agricultural activities. It was desirable then to employ women on the 
management of land. However, women could fill this role more efficiently only if they were given appropriate incentives in 
terms of property rights, in other words they had the right to receive by inheritance and to bequeath the land. Thus, women 
enjoyed important inheritance rights during the Spartan regime. However, once occupied lands were lost and women’s 
fertility rate diminished because of their increased opportunity costs while working, women’s rights began to be restricted. 
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although customary rules vested women with significant rights on land, the managerial control and the 
jural authority over land was vested in men (Agarwal 1994).
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(iii) The exogenous removal of the charters regime by Napoleon at the beginning of the XIX century 
brings about two considerations. First, unlike in modern states, within the charters regime each 
community had the right to locally establish and discretionally change inheritance rules on collective 
resources. This decentralized decision process might have locked the alpine communities in a 
patrilineal system. Consider for instance a community that decided on a possible transition from a 
patrilineal to an egalitarian inheritance system to improve the genetic health of the community. In some 
situations this change could have taken place if all other communities had been characterized by an 
egalitarian system but not if they were under a patrilineal system. The reason is that the costs in terms 
of per-capita collective wealth could have been much higher in the latter case. Hence, decentralized 
decisions on inheritance could have made it very difficult to switch from a patrilineal system to an 
egalitarian one. Second, this decentralized decision system was later replaced by a centralized 
government that did not allow local variations in inheritance rules. In Trentino, the Napoleon invasion 
of 1796 brought about an exogenous shock that soon put an end to the charters experience. It is difficult 
to assess whether this change improved the welfare of the region as a whole. In principle, it is possible 
that the centralized adoption of an inheritance system would be globally optimal. Besides the argument 
of genetic health, a universal egalitarian system could work as an insurance scheme against shocks 
hitting communities asymmetrically. In a long-run perspective, risk-averse individuals would prefer to 
live in a society without heavy costs of moving to other villages in case of exogenous shocks. 
However, as we have documented, with decisions decentralized at the community level an egalitarian 
inheritance system is likely to be evolutionarily unstable. 
7. Conclusions 
Over a period of six centuries, women in the Italian Alps gradually lost their property rights on the 
commons. This finding comes from a systematic study of inheritance systems on the commons in about 
three hundred villages between the 13
th
 and 19
th
 century. Thus, in the late medieval period women in 
the Alps had substantially more rights on collective properties than in the modern period. 
We argue that this erosion in women’s rights emerged as a protective measure to preserve the per-
capita endowment of collective properties within a community. Hence, there exist economic factors 
behind this institutional change. Egalitarian inheritance systems on the commons were evolutionarily 
unstable because they allowed immigration from outside through marriage, which threatened the 
community common resources. Members of richer communities could react to preserve their share of 
commons by introducing a gender-biased inheritance system. A patrilineal system contributed to keep 
community size stable by limiting net migration through marriage. The open question is why the 
Trentino communities selected a patrilineal over a matrilineal inheritance system on the commons. A 
                                                          
27 Very few communities have adopted matrilineal inheritance systems. Sometimes the word matrilineal has been used with 
a different meaning, for instance in the case of the so-called uterine matrilineal systems in Western Ghana in which land is 
allocated to males and transferred intergenerationally to males; however this occurs through the members of the matriclan 
and women have access to land only through their husbands or fathers (Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997, Quisumbing et al. 2001, La 
Ferrara 2007). 
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matrilineal system would have delivered the same consequences in terms of net migration. The 
communities may have preferred a patrilineal system because of social, cultural, or further economic 
reasons (e.g. Alesina et al. 2013) – a question that we leave for future investigation. 
Discriminating women in property rights had deep impacts on the openness and endogamy levels of 
communities. For a given pattern of inheritance systems in the region, one can infer a level, direction, 
and type of migrations across communities. If all communities adopted an egalitarian system, one could 
expect a high level of internal migrations, going from the poor toward the rich communities in terms of 
per-capita collective wealth, and involving both men and women. If all communities adopted a 
patrilineal system, one could expect a low level of internal migrations, spread evenly across all 
communities, and involving mostly women. Over the long-term, introducing a gender-biased 
inheritance system to close the community to immigration generated a trade-off between preserving the 
per-capita collective wealth and undermining the variety in the community genetic pool. We observed a 
subset of Trentino communities and found that the level of endogamy in marriage steadily increased 
over the centuries, which may have weakened their genetic health. 
At the regional level, this institutional change spread by contagion. Left alone under decentralized 
decision-making, communities engaged in a progressive closure towards outsiders. This process was 
characterized by path-dependency: the earlier decisions of some communities to change the inheritance 
system in favour of men effectively set the direction for the subsequent adjustments in other 
communities, leading the whole region toward a patrilineal system. If a community had switched to a 
matrilineal system in the middle of the process, that would not have been enough to steer the whole 
region toward a matrilineal system.  
Once the process was completed, the communities were locked into a situation of women’s 
discrimination and unable to move the region back to an egalitarian inheritance system. The lock-in 
effect springs from the decentralized decision-making over inheritance systems. In fact, a shift from a 
patrilineal to an egalitarian system could not have taken place through unilateral changes. Consider, as 
a thought experiment, an overnight decentralized change to an egalitarian system by all communities. 
This would not generate a new stable situation. On the contrary, it would trigger a decentralized 
process of adjustment toward a gender-biased system, either back to the patrilineal system or toward a 
matrilineal system. One way to restore gender equality would be to have a central state implementing a 
uniform egalitarian system on the whole region. After the Napoleonic invasion, a centralized state 
replaced the traditional political regime. Communities lost their autonomy of decision over the 
management of the commons and the local definition of property rights. An open question is about the 
role of a central state in ensuring gender equality in property rights. 
In conclusion, the inheritance system on common resources turned out to be a cornerstone of a social 
and economic structure because of its consequences on migration patterns, genetic mixing, regional 
economic inequalities, population growth, and gender discrimination. The very long-term perspective 
of this study has allowed to capture the underground deep forces that shaped human societies over the 
centuries.  
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